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NOTES
RESISTING  RULEMAKING:  CHALLENGING  THE
MONTANA  SETTLEMENT’S  TITLE  IX  SEXUAL
HARASSMENT  BLUEPRINT
Katie Jo Baumgardner *
“Sexual assault and sexual harassment are intolerable; they undermine women’s basic
rights and, when perpetrated against students, can negatively impact their ability to
learn and continue their education.  As we approach the 40th anniversary of Title IX
this year (2012), incidents of sexual assault on our college campuses remind us of the
continuing critical importance of the law to reduce barriers in education.  Our goal is
to determine whether there are violations of federal law and if we find a problem, work
cooperatively with [universities] to ensure that all students . . .  feel safe in their com-
munities, regardless of sex.”1
—Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division
“Let me say this respectfully and with as much clarity as I can: you do not know my
work.  You do not know what I face every day in responding to a student culture of
alcohol-infused hook-ups, where regrettable sex is a daily occurrence. . . . [The adminis-
trator’s] voice has been missing from this debate . . . [No university wants the Office of
Civil Rights] knocking on our doors, Title IX complaint in hand, ready to put [our
university] under the microscope . . . .”2
—Anonymous Student Affairs Professional
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.A in
University Scholars, Baylor University, 2011.  I would like to thank Professors Jeffrey
Pojanowski and Patricia O’Hara for their invaluable guidance and mentorship throughout
the writing process.  I also thank Justin Luningham and Paul Baumgardner for their input,
and the rest of my family and friends for their constant love and support.  Finally, I thank
the members of Volume 89 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their insight and suggestions.
1 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Announces Investigations of the
Handling of Sexual Assault Allegations by the University of Montana, the Missoula, Mont.,
Police Department and the Missoula County Attorney’s Office (May 1, 2012) [hereinafter
Montana Press Release], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-crt-561.html.
2 An Open Letter to OCR, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.insidehigher
ed.com/views/2011/10/28/essay-ocr-guidelines-sexual-assault-hurt-colleges-and-students.
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INTRODUCTION
Every university and college across the nation—with the exception of
three3—accepts federal financial assistance.  Consequently, in the world of
higher education, the impact of administrative regulation and compliance
that accompanies federal funding cannot be overstated.  Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in
education programs or activities operated by recipients of federal financial
assistance.4  The text of Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”5  Since its enactment in
1972, Title IX most often has been associated with bolstering the participa-
tion of female students in athletics.6  Title IX has generally been associated
with the athletic arena, although the statute does not expressly address
athletics.7
Until relatively recently, however, Title IX’s application to sexual harass-
ment was less well known.  A superficial reading of the text does not immedi-
ately evidence inclusion of claims of sexual violence on college campuses.  In
fact, nothing in Title IX’s legislative history indicates congressional intent to
reach claims of sexual misconduct at all.8  The idea that Title IX covers sex-
ual misconduct took root years after the passage of the statute.  Nonetheless,
the legal proposition that sexual harassment can constitute discrimination on
the basis of sex under Title IX is now well settled, as the Supreme Court, in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, noted explicitly that “sexual har-
3 Hillsdale College in Michigan, Grove City College in Pennsylvania, and Patrick
Henry College in Virginia remain independent of federal funding. See History, HILLSDALE
COLL., http://www.hillsdale.edu/about/history (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (“On the pre-
text that some of its students were receiving federal loans, the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare attempted to interfere with the College’s internal affairs . . . . [T]he
College . . . announced that rather than complying with unconstitutional federal regula-
tion, it would instruct its students that they could no longer bring federal taxpayer money
to Hillsdale.”); Supreme Court Case, GROVE CITY COLL., http://www.gcc.edu/about/whowe
are/Pages/Supreme-Court-Case.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (“In order to preserve
and protect its independence, Grove City College refused federal student aid beginning in
the mid-1980s.”); Financial Aid, PATRICK HENRY COLL., http://www.phc.edu/financial.php
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (“In order to safeguard our distinctly Christian worldview, we
do not accept or participate in government funding.  We believe such financial indepen-
dence to be a critical component of a Patrick Henry College education.”).
4 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).
5 Id. § 1681(a).
6 Christine I. Hepler, Symposium, A Bibliography of Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 441, 441 (2013).
7 Id. Requirements that schools offer male and female students equal opportunities
to play sports, give male and female athletes their fair share of athletic scholarship money,
and treat male and female athletes equally in all other respects are the most well-known
aspects of Title IX. Id.
8 Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 51 (2013).
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assment can constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX.”9
Moreover, it is clear that Title IX also requires schools and colleges to protect
students from sexual misconduct, sexual harassment, and sexual violence,
and to take seriously all reports of sexual harassment.10
It is with this background that we arrive at the current Title IX land-
scape.  The evolution of sexual harassment standards in the law and in Title
IX compliance has had an immense impact on higher education.  The
Department of Education (DOE) is authorized and directed to carry into
effect Title IX’s nondiscrimination mandate by issuing rules and regulations
consistent with achieving the statute’s objectives.11  The DOE delegates to
the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) responsibility for enforcing Title IX and
ensuring that institutions receiving federal funding comply with Title IX.12
But the DOE and OCR have not published rules or regulations in the area of
sexual harassment.  Instead, OCR has issued guidance and “Dear Colleague”
letters (DCLs).  Under Title IX, OCR has jurisdiction to investigate com-
plaints of noncompliance involving institutions receiving federal funds.13
Failure to voluntarily comply with DOE standards can result in proceedings
to withdraw federal funding.14  OCR also has the power to refer a case to the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for litigation.15  Since 2011, universities
across the nation have been scrambling to enact policies and procedures that
comply with DOE guidance.
Notably, OCR has the authority to initiate compliance reviews even if no
complaint has been filed against the institution.16  By initiating reviews and
investigations, OCR can target discrimination and highlight Title IX issues
that the DOE thinks all higher education institutions should address.  OCR’s
articulated rationale is simple: “By addressing new or emerging problems in
this way, . . . OCR can set a tone for future compliance.”17
9 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998) (citing Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998)); see also id. at 299–300 n.10.
10 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUI-
DANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PAR-
TIES (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter 2001 GUIDANCE], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf.
11 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
12 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (2013) (“[Section] 106 applies to every recipient and to the edu-
cation program or activity operated by such recipient which receives Federal financial
assistance.”).
13 Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS. (Aug. 1998),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.
14 20 U.S.C. § 1682; see also “Dear Colleague” Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y
for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS. 16 (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter
2011 DCL], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf.
15 See 2011 DCL, supra note 14, at 16.
16 Id.; see also Kristin Galles, Title IX and the Importance of a Reinvigorated OCR, 37 HUM.
RTS. 18, 20 (2010) (discussing OCR’s scope of authority).
17 Galles, supra note 16, at 20.
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This Note argues that OCR’s compliance investigations do more than
“set a tone”: the DOE—through OCR—uses the resulting findings and settle-
ment agreements to force compliance of the entire higher education com-
munity with standards announced in its guidance and “Dear Colleague”
letters, but not promulgated in rules and regulations adopted pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Ultimately, universities face difficult decisions as they implement compli-
ance measures at the university administration level and deal with student
issues on their individual campuses.  Given the DOE’s threat of pulling fed-
eral funding, universities are forced to choose between affording students
meaningful due process protections and complying with the newest govern-
ment guidance.  As one higher education professional asks: “Do we really
want to be tagging students with scarlet letters? . . . Or do we want to protect
our educational mission?”18
When dealing with Title IX and sexual harassment standards, the strug-
gle is particularly acute; universities strive to design grievance procedures
that balance protecting victims with providing adequate due process for
accused students.  This burden is complicated by the fact that sexual harass-
ment claims, by their very nature, involve at least one party who feels like he
or she has been sexually harassed.  For institutions of higher education, this
delicate balancing act presents broader questions about how far colleges
should go in assuming investigative responsibility for issues that continue to
frustrate the American legal system.19
These issues are manifest in the new sexual harassment standard set
forth in the DOE’s Resolution Agreement and the accompanying Findings
Letter regarding an investigation of the University of Montana.  In May 2012,
the DOJ Civil Rights Division announced that it would join the OCR to con-
duct a formal Title IX20 compliance review and Title IV investigation regard-
ing the University of Montana’s response to sexual assaults and sexual
harassment of students.21
Between September 2010 and December 2011, there had been allega-
tions of student-on-student sexual assault at the University of Montana, as
well as many alleged rapes in the surrounding town of Missoula in that three
year period.22  In a town where there had been at least eighty alleged rapes
in the past three years, and a university where there had been nine allega-
18 Libby Sander, 3 Accused of Sexual Misconduct Say Colleges Acted Hastily and Assumed
Guilt, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/3-Accused-of-
Sexual-Misconduct/141551/ (quoting Peter F. Lake, director of the Center for Excellence
in Higher Education Law and Policy at Stetson University) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
19 Id.
20 This Note will only address the issues raised by the Title IX compliance review.  The
Title IV investigation (although related and intertwined in the Findings Letter) is not the
primary focus of this Note.
21 See Montana Press Release, supra note 1.
22 Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Dep’t of Educ. to President Royce Engstrom and
Lucy France, Esq., The University of Montana, DOJ Case No. DJ 169-44-9, OCR Case No.
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tions of student-on-student sexual assault, the Title IX compliance review was
particularly important.23  In response, the university took steps—termed “ini-
tial reforms”24—to prevent future harassment even before the formal investi-
gation began.  The government investigation included a review of these new
efforts.25
For over a year, the DOE and the DOJ investigated the university’s poli-
cies and procedures.26  They assessed the university’s policies, its implemen-
tation of policies, its adherence to proper procedures, and its responses to
sexual harassment and sexual violence.27  Ultimately, the investigation and
review included a comprehensive examination of the university’s policies,
grievance procedures, and Title IX enforcement.28  The DOE and DOJ
reviewed thousands of documents, including all student complaints filed over
three academic years.  The investigation included multiple site visits and over
forty interviews.29
The conclusion of the DOE and DOJ investigation on May 9, 2013
resulted in two documents: a Resolution Agreement30 outlining the compli-
ance agreement between the University of Montana and the DOE and DOJ,
and a Findings Letter31 documenting the investigation’s findings.  The inves-
tigative approach, standards applied by the government, findings, and reme-
dies were explained in the Findings Letter.32  In the Findings Letter, DOE
stated: “The Agreement will serve as a blueprint for colleges and universities
throughout the country to protect students from sexual harassment and
assault.”33
The sixteen-page Resolution Agreement and thirty-one-page Findings
Letter significantly redefined sexual harassment.34  Prior to the government
investigation, section 406.5.1 of the University of Montana’s Sexual Harass-
10126001, at 2 (May 9, 2013) [hereinafter Findings Letter], available at http://www2.ed
.gov/documents/press-releases/montana-missoula-letter.pdf.
23 See Montana Press Release, supra note 1.
24 See Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 3.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 2.
27 Id. at 3.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3–4.
30 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & DEP’T OF EDUC., DOJ CASE NO. DJ 169-44-9, OCR CASE NO.
10126001, RESOLUTION AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA – MISSOULA, THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES SECTION
AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 2 (May 9, 2013) [here-
inafter RESOLUTION AGREEMENT], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/docu
ments/montanaagree.pdf.
31 See Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 2.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1.
34 See, e.g., Sara Lipka, Colleges Consider a New ‘Blueprint’ for Responding to Sexual Assault,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 24, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Consider-a-
New/140503/ (explaining the impact of the Montana Resolution on higher education
institutions).
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ment Policy defined sexual harassment as “conduct that ‘is sufficiently severe
or pervasive as to disrupt or undermine a person’s ability to participate in or
receive the benefits, services, or opportunities of the University, including
unreasonably interfering with a person’s work or educational perform-
ance.’”35  In determining whether conduct constituted sexual harassment
under this definition, the university used the following standard: “[w]hether
conduct is sufficiently offensive to constitute sexual harassment is deter-
mined from the perspective of an objectively reasonable person of the same
gender in the same situation.”36
In this regard, Montana’s Sexual Harassment Policy tracked the DOE’s
sexual harassment standard in the 2003 DCL—which was itself based on the
DOE’s 2001 sexual harassment guidance and, more importantly, on the
Supreme Court’s holding in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education—stat-
ing that alleged sexual harassment claims “be evaluated from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the alleged victim’s position.”37
In contrast, the Findings Letter stated that “[s]exual harassment is
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature”38 and noted:
[The University of Montana’s Sexual Harassment Policy] improperly
suggests that the conduct does not constitute sexual harassment unless it is
objectively offensive. . . . Whether conduct is objectively offensive . . . is not
the standard to determine whether conduct was “unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature” and therefore constitutes “sexual harassment.”  As explained
in the Legal Standards39 section above, the United States considers a variety
of factors, from both a subjective and objective perspective . . . .40
The Findings Letter stated that “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature”
includes “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, such as sexual
assault or acts of sexual violence.”41  The Montana Resolution invites stu-
dents to come forward with claims when they have been subjected to any
unwelcome sexual conduct, and requires the university to evaluate all alleged
conduct to determine if it created “a hostile environment.”42
35 See Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 8 (quoting the University of Montana’s Sexual
Harassment Policy 406.5.1).
36 Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting the University of Montana’s Sexual Harass-
ment Policy 406.5.1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 First Amendment: “Dear Colleague” Letter from the Assistant Sec. for Civil Rights,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS. (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 DCL] (emphasis
added), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/firstamend.html. See gen-
erally Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that harassment
claims are to be judged based whether they are objectively offensive); 2001 GUIDANCE,
supra note 10, at 30 n.39.
38 See Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 8.
39 See id. at 4 (“Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature . . . .”) (empha-
sis added).
40 Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 4.
42 Id.
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The Findings Letter also required the university to take immediate steps
to protect a complainant from further harassment and minimize the burden
on the complainant “prior to the completion of the Title IX . . . investiga-
tion.”43  The letter offered examples of “appropriate steps,” including taking
steps to separate the accused and the complainant or providing counseling
for one or both parties.44  One of the proposed actions, however, is “taking
disciplinary action against the harasser.”45  Simply put, accused students can
be punished before they are found guilty of harassment.
This Note will argue that when the DOE labeled the Montana Resolu-
tion Agreement as a document to be used as a “blueprint for colleges and
universities throughout the country,” the agency promulgated a legislative
rule that should be subject to judicial review under the APA.  Part I of this
Note introduces the landscape of sexual harassment claims before the Mon-
tana Resolution Agreement and examines the standard for sexual harass-
ment set forth in case law; traces the DOE’s articulated standards from the
DOE sexual harassment guidance issued in 2001 (2001 Guidance) to the
“Dear Colleague” letter of April 4, 201146 (April 2011 DCL) and the Montana
Resolution; and discusses the negative effects of the more expansive standard
for measuring sexual harassment in the Montana Resolution on institutions
of higher education.  Part II then examines relevant administrative law prin-
ciples and the application of these principles to this particular problem,
including a discussion of how best to challenge agency rulemaking under the
APA.  Part III focuses specifically on challenging the Montana “blueprint”
under the framework of the APA, using Association of Irritated Residents v. EPA
as an illustrative example of how a court should analyze the use of the Mon-
tana Resolution Agreement.  Part III concludes that, functionally, the Mon-
tana Resolution imposes a subjective sexual harassment standard on the
entire higher education community and should be deemed improper legisla-
tive rulemaking.  Finally, Part IV recommends litigation to challenge the stan-
dard for sexual harassment set forth by the DOE in the Montana Resolution.
Part IV argues that successful litigation would compel the DOE to amend its
sexual harassment standard to conform with existing case law and, ultimately,
conduct future rulemaking in a manner that complies with the notice and
comment requirements of the APA.
I. RELEVANT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Title IX Case Law
Three Supreme Court cases provide the legal framework for evaluating
sexual harassment claims. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.47 is the foundational
Supreme Court decision setting forth the standard for evaluating sexual har-
43 Id. at 6.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 2011 DCL, supra note 14.
47 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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assment.  Decided in 1993, Harris involved a sexual harassment claim under
Title VII.  The Court found that “[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond
Title VII’s purview.”48  The Court consequently characterized the objective
standard in Harris as setting a “high bar”49 intended to prevent Title VII from
becoming a “general civility code.”50  The objective standard of Harris—and
its accompanying reasoning—has been consistently applied to Title IX sexual
harassment claims.51
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District,52 a case involving a Title IX claim of teacher-on-student sexual
harassment.53  The Court held that a school district could not be held liable
for damages under Title IX unless a school official had actual notice of, and
was deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s sexual misconduct.54  The Gebser
opinion also noted that the DOE has the “authority to promulgate and
enforce requirements that effectuate the [Title IX] nondiscrimination man-
date.”55  Although this Note does not focus on school liability, Gebser is
important because it is cited by the DOE’s Title IX significant guidance docu-
ments as one of the cases setting forth the standard for Title IX
compliance.56
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Monroe County Board of Edu-
cation,57 concluding that student-on-student, peer harassment provides a pri-
vate cause of action for money damages under Title IX when a school “acts
with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or
activities.”58  The Court applied a standard similar to the standard in Harris.
To prove a claim under Title IX, a plaintiff must show “harassment that is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s
access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”59  The Davis case dealt with
elementary school students, but Justice Kennedy in his dissent noted that
“the majority’s holding would appear to apply with equal force to
universities.”60
48 Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
49 EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008).
50 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
51 See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) (“We look to
case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in evaluating a
claim brought under Title IX.”).
52 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
53 Id. at 277.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 292.
56 See, e.g., 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at iv–vi, 30 n.39 (affirming that OCR would
determine Title IX compliance by using the standard in Gebser and Davis).
57 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
58 Id. at 633.
59 Id. (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 667 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy’s prediction proved correct; lower federal courts have
applied the objective standard to sexual harassment claims in higher educa-
tion, as well as K-12 education and employment.61  Although the “reasonable
woman” standard may be controversial,62 the Supreme Court has not backed
away from using it to evaluate cases involving sexual harassment claims in
education and employment.
B. Department of Education: Higher Education Title IX Guidance
In 2001, the DOE released a guidance document titled Revised Sexual
Harassment Guidance.63  This document looked to case law interpreting
61 In December 2013, a California district court cited Davis in Lopez v. Regents of the
University of California, noting that “to state a prima facie case under Title IX based on
student-to-student sexual harassment, Plaintiffs must show: (1) The sexual harassment was
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits.”  Lopez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. C-13-2811 EMC, 2013 WL 6492395, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (emphasis added).
In March 2013, a Kentucky district court also applied Davis, noting that the Sixth Circuit
had summarized Davis when it
held that in order to establish a prima facie case of student-on-student sexual
harassment for the purposes of Title IX, the plaintiff must show . . . that the
sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could
be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or bene-
fits provided by the school . . . .
Moore v. Murray State Univ., No. 5:12-CV-00178, 2013 WL 960320, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 12,
2013) (emphasis added).  In cases involving primary and secondary education, federal
courts have also continued to apply Davis.  On March 27, 2013, a district court applied the
Davis standard to a case involving peer harassment of a high school student who commit-
ted suicide.  Moore v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1314 (M.D. Ala.
2013) (noting that sexual harassment must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or
benefits provided by the school” (quoting S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir.
2008))).  In Title VII cases, courts have continued to apply the Davis standard.  On Sep-
tember 27, 2013, the Fifth Circuit applied the “objective ‘reasonable person’ standard to
evaluate severity and pervasiveness” to a Title VII action.  EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co.,
731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013).  On January 28, 2013, the First Circuit applied the objec-
tive standard, asking whether “a reasonable person [would] find the conduct” severe and
pervasive.  Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir. 2013).  At the district court level,
on July 9, 2013, a district court in Pennsylvania applied the objective standard when it
decided Young v. Pleasant Valley School District.  No. 3:07–cv–00854, 2013 WL 3456946, at *3
(M.D. Pa. July 9, 2013) (noting that, in order to avoid turning “Title VII into a ‘general
civility code,’ . . . the Supreme Court has reminded lower courts of the limitations that
govern such claims”).  On March 14, 2013, a district court in North Carolina applied the
same standard in Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp.  930 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633–34 (E.D.N.C. 2013)
(finding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence that “[t]he conduct in the present case
[was] severe enough to clear the ‘high bar’ which is intended to prevent Title VII from
becoming a general civility code”).
62 See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of
the “Reasonable Woman” Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 773
(1993).
63 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 10.
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Title VII and Title IX harassment standards to guide its own evaluation of
Title IX claims.64  Like Title IX, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex.65  The 2001 Guidance stated that OCR, in investigating compli-
ance, would use the standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Gebser and
Davis.66
Two years later, in 2003, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights issued a
“Dear Colleague” letter addressing sexual harassment standards and the First
Amendment.  This 2003 DCL explicitly stated that harassment “must include
something beyond the mere expression of views, words, symbols or thoughts
that some person finds offensive.”67  The letter further outlined the OCR’s
standard for evaluating conduct:
Under OCR’s standard, the conduct must also be considered sufficiently
serious to deny or limit a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from
the educational program.  Thus, OCR’s standards require that the conduct be
evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person in the alleged victim’s position,
considering all the circumstances . . . .68
This 2003 letter was the DOE’s most recent guidance about sexual harass-
ment standards until the Montana Resolution Agreement in 2013.
In April 2011, another DCL outlined the evidentiary burden that institu-
tions should use in grievance procedures investigating sexual harassment
claims.69  OCR requires schools to provide equitable grievance procedures.
The April 2011 DCL did not modify the 2001 definition of sexual harass-
ment, but it did change the evidentiary standard to be used in sexual harass-
ment claims to a “preponderance of the evidence.”70  The April 2011 DCL
64 Id. at ii, vi; see also id. at vi (noting that the Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education indicated, “through its specific references to Title VII caselaw, that Title
VII remains relevant in determining what constitutes hostile environment sexual harass-
ment under Title IX”). See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75
(1998) (a sexual harassment case decided under Title VII).
65 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) (“We look to case law
interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in evaluating a claim
brought under Title IX.” (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 651)).
66 See 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at iv–vi, 30 n.39 (affirming that OCR would deter-
mine Title IX compliance by using the standard in Gebser and Davis).
67 See 2003 DCL, supra note 37.
68 Id. (emphasis added).  It should be noted that the consideration of “all the circum-
stances” is not meant to include the subjective interpretation of the victim.  Rather, it is
meant to encompass all the circumstances regarding the alleged harassment.  Thus, if con-
duct is more serious (e.g., sexual assault), one single instance could certainly constitute
harassment from a reasonable person’s perspective.  However, a single occasion of less
serious conduct (e.g., catcalling) might be perceived as very offensive by the victim, but
would not constitute harassment from the reasonable person’s perspective, considering all
the circumstances (namely, the number of occasions on which this occurred and the seri-
ousness of the alleged action).  This 2003 DCL does not give weight to the victim’s subjec-
tive view of the conduct, but instead emphasizes the reasonable person standard.
69 See 2011 DCL, supra note 14, at 10–11.
70 Preponderance of the evidence is best understood as a “more likely than not” stan-
dard of proof. Id. at 11.
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stated that the use of a “clear and convincing”71 standard was inconsistent
with the standard of proof established for violations of the civil rights laws,
thus making them not equitable under Title IX.72  In adopting the “prepon-
derance of the evidence” standard, DOE and OCR chose the same standard
that the Supreme Court has applied in civil litigation involving discrimina-
tion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.73  OCR cited the
Supreme Court’s use of the “preponderance of the evidence” as the primary
reason for applying that evidentiary standard.74
This decision was met with frustration from schools across the nation,
many of which utilized the “clear and convincing” or “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard in their own disciplinary hearings.75  A survey conducted of
the top 100 universities concluded that, in general, the higher a school’s
ranking, the more likely it was to use an evidentiary standard above the
“50.01% standard” mandated in the DCL.76  Moreover, several schools had
discussed and rejected the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in the
past.77  The April 2011 DCL meant that colleges were no longer permitted to
determine for themselves the appropriate level of due process protections to
grant their accused students.78  University officials expressed concern that a
“preponderance of evidence” standard would mean “more convictions—of
both guilty and innocent individuals.”79
A case at Stanford University brought these concerns into sharp relief.80
In February 2011, a student at Stanford was accused of sexual assault.  At the
time Stanford initiated disciplinary proceedings, its standard of responsibility
was “beyond a reasonable doubt.”81  This standard, paralleling that used in
71 Clear and convincing requires that it “is highly probable or reasonably certain that
the sexual harassment or violence occurred.” Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252–55 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (approving the preponderance standard in a Title VII sex discrimination case)).
74 Id.
75 See Standard of Evidence Survey: Colleges and Universities Respond to OCR’s New Mandate,
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUCATION (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Standard of Evidence
Survey], http://www.thefire.org/standard-of-evidence-survey-colleges-and-universities-
respond-to-ocrs-new-mandate/.
76 Id. (“FIRE surveyed the top 100 colleges and universities in the country, as defined
by the 2011 U.S. News & World Report rankings.  Nine of the colleges ranked in the top 10
used a standard other than preponderance of the evidence. . . . In general, the higher a
school’s U.S. News ranking, the more likely that school would protect accused students with
a higher standard than the OCR-mandated 50.01% standard.”).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Greg Lukianoff, Feds to Students: You Can’t Say That, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2013, 7:15
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732358290457848504130476
3554 (quoting former Dean of Harvard College Harry Lewis).
80 Andrew R. Kloster, Student and Professorial Causes of Action Against Non-University
Actors, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 143, 143 (2013) (summarizing the Stanford case); see
also Standard of Evidence Survey, supra note 75.
81 Kloster, supra note 80, at 143.
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the criminal justice system, had been in place at Stanford since 1968.82  Mid-
way through the case, the DOE issued its April 2011 DCL.  Stanford promptly
changed its burden of proof to “preponderance of the evidence.”83  Under
the new standard, the student was found guilty and suspended.  Although it is
possible that the student would have been expelled under the old standard,
“at least one juror would have exonerated the student under the ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ standard.”84
There was no real resistance to the DOE’s April 2011 DCL from Stanford
or any other university.  Some college administrators complained—one in an
anonymous letter, describing his anonymity as a byproduct of worrying about
attracting OCR attention85—but most officials meekly accepted the DOE’s
informal (and coercive) guidance.  Like Stanford, universities changed their
burden of proof standard and moved on.86
It was not until the Montana Resolution Agreement, announced in 2013,
that the DOE gave any indication that the standard for evaluating sexual har-
assment claims should be anything other than the historical “objective” stan-
dard.  With the Findings Letter, the DOE set forth a new standard defining
sexual harassment.  The Montana Resolution Agreement and Findings Letter
represent the DOE’s latest interpretation of Title IX standards.  These docu-
ments redefined the sexual harassment standard that had been in place since
the Supreme Court’s rulings in Gebser and Davis.  As recently as 2003, OCR
guidance interpreted sexual harassment using the objective standard set
forth in Supreme Court case law.  The 2003 DCL affirmed the standard that
conduct be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person.87  Now, the Mon-
tana Resolution imposes a standard that flouts the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Davis.  Instead, institutions of higher education must use the standard found
in the Findings Letter: sexual harassment is any unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature.88
C. Widening the Lens: The Effect of the Montana Agreement on Higher Education
The importance of the DOE guidance and DCLs lies in their effect on
institutions of higher education across the nation.  In the April 2011 DCL,
the DOE calls the letter a “significant guidance document,” and notes that it
82 Id. at 143–44.
83 Elizabeth Titus, Stanford Lowers Standard of Proof for Sexual Assault, STANFORD DAILY
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.stanforddaily.com/2011/04/12/stanford-lowers-standard-of-
proof-for-sexual-assault/.
84 Kloster, supra note 80, at 144, 146.
85 See An Open Letter to OCR, supra note 2.
86 See Standard of Evidence Survey, supra note 75 (“Confronted by the threat of losing
federal funding for failure to comply with OCR’s new directive, colleges and universities
nationwide have scrambled to revise their policies to comport with OCR’s April 4, 2011,
‘Dear Colleague’ letter . . . . 39 colleges ranked in the top 100 have already changed or will
be required to change their standard of evidence to comply with the OCR mandate.”).
87 2003 DCL, supra note 37.
88 Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 5.
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“does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and
examples to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates [compliance].”89
Yet, the letter also states that the DOE, in seeking “to obtain voluntary com-
pliance,” reserves the right to have OCR initiate proceedings to withdraw
Federal Title IX funding if an institution does not come into compliance
voluntarily.90  The DOE’s request that schools “proactively consider”91 imple-
menting these guidelines is little more than a thinly veiled threat.  Given the
thoroughness of OCR investigations, the potential for litigation, and the
threat of losing federal funding, virtually no university is willing to risk non-
compliance with DOE’s guidelines.  In an anonymous letter written to the
OCR by a student affairs professional at an accredited university, the writer
expressed his view that the April 2011 DCL’s guidance “at best complicates
[administrators’] work, at worst undermines [their] judgment and [their]
ability to make good decisions for [their] institution and [their] students.”92
Although the Montana Resolution was only released in May, by now,
many universities across the nation have implemented the guidance set forth
in those documents.93  The debate rages on.94  Special interest groups like
the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) are outraged by
the impact that this standard could have on free speech, allowing individuals
who are offended by speech to claim sexual harassment.95  Senator John
McCain published an open letter to United States Attorney General Eric
Holder, expressing his concerns about the Montana Resolution, saying it “cir-
89 See 2011 DCL, supra note 14, at 1 n.1.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 16.
92 An Open Letter to OCR, supra note 2.
93 The same “threat of losing federal funding for failure to comply with OCR’s new
directive” that colleges and universities felt in response to the 2011 DCL certainly applies
here, too. See Standard of Evidence Survey, supra note 75.  Although a survey has not yet been
conducted to determine how many schools have changed their definition of sexual harass-
ment, it is reasonable—given the propensity of schools to “scramble[ ] to revise their poli-
cies to comport with OCR”—to assume that many have already made the change outlined
in the Montana Resolution’s blueprint. Id.
94 See, e.g., Allie Grasgreen, Classrooms, Courts, or Neither?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 12,
2014), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/02/12/disagreement-campus-judicial-
systems (“Since the U.S. Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights affirmed in its
2011 [DCL] that colleges should use a lower standard of evidence than criminal courts
when adjudicating sexual assault complaints, many civil liberties advocates, lawyers and
even politicians have accused the federal government of trampling students’ right to due
process.  Campus officials, for the most part, have stressed that adjudication is an educa-
tional experience, where students are found ‘responsible’ rather than ‘guilty,’ so their
processes should be different from the criminal justice system’s.  But during a two-day ‘dia-
logue’ about sexual misconduct and college students here at the University of Virginia, it
was clear that discontent over OCR’s decree—not to mention the question of whether
colleges should even be adjudicating these cases in the first place—is alive and well within
academe.”).
95 Russell Westerholm, Free Speech Coalition Files Open Letter to U.S. Department of Justice
and Education to Retract Sexual Harassment Settlement, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUCATION
(July 17, 2001), http://thefire.org/article/16062.html.
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cumvented the regular rulemaking process and congressional authority by
redefining long-standing legal precedent through a settlement agreement
with a single university.”96
By opening up sexual harassment to mean any unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature, the DOE moves from applying an objective standard to apply-
ing a subjective standard.  The use of this subjective standard means that all
claims of sexual harassment that a student brings forth—any conduct that is
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, including claims a reasonable person
would not find to be objectively offensive—must be investigated.  In plain
English, “any unwelcome speech or conduct of a sexual nature is harassment,
even if it would not offend a reasonable person.”97  It does not take much
imagination to think of everyday actions the subjective standard would now
deem inappropriate.98  Under this standard, “an unwelcome request for a
date” could constitute harassment,99 as could any expression related to sex-
ual topics that offends any person, including “a campus performance of ‘The
Vagina Monologues,’ a presentation on safe sex practices, a debate about
sexual morality . . . any sexually-themed joke.”100  Although claims of sexual
assault (meaning, specifically, “intercourse without consent”)101 would cer-
tainly rise to the level of sexual harassment under both the subjective stan-
dard and the objective standard, a single instance of unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature (e.g., an unsuccessful request for a date),102 could now be con-
strued as sexual harassment under the subjective standard.  It could be
enough to land a student in the midst of a sexual harassment investigation.
96 Press Release, Senator John McCain Sends Letters to DOJ and EPA on Obama
Administration Settlement Abuse, (June 26, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release, Senator
John McCain Sends Letters], http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/6/
post-818fd6f0-b009-240c-b963-7b7bb47f03fb.
97 Hans Bader, How the Education Department Would Limit Dating, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(May 23, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Dark-Cloud-Over-Academic/139463/.
98 Lipka, supra note 34 (explaining the impact of the Montana Resolution on higher
education institutions).
99 This example has been commonly used to demonstrate the type of subjectively
offensive verbal conduct of a sexual nature that would have been excluded under the rea-
sonable person standard, but falls within the standard set forth in the Montana Resolution.
See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, No Sex Talk Allowed, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://
www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/05/no-sex-talk-allowed/275782/.
100 Federal Government Mandates Unconstitutional Speech Codes at Colleges and Universities
Nationwide, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUCATION (May 17, 2013), http://thefire.org/
article/15767.html.
101 See Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 1 n.1 (“Although “sexual assault” is a form of
“sexual harassment,” where this letter refers to “sexual assault” and “sexual harassment”
separately, it is differentiating sexual contact, including intercourse without consent (“sex-
ual assault”), from unwanted conduct of a sexual nature that does not rise to the level of
sexual assault.”).
102 Lukianoff, supra note 79 (listing examples of instances where conduct could subjec-
tively constitute sexual harassment).
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In the past, the “reasonable person” standard protected the accused against
unreasonable or insincere allegations.103
Concluding that the new definition includes asking someone out on a
date, telling jokes, and discussing politics or morality is not a baseless exag-
geration.  In the past, sexual harassment claims have been made against uni-
versity professors for giving controversial (and potentially subjectively
offensive) lectures or expressing unpopular opinions.104  Given the
increased number of potential claims, the number of claims that will require
investigation may increase.  Furthermore, while this Note does not elaborate
on the additional requirements set forth in the Montana Resolution—num-
bering more than forty105—the administrative burden of complying with the
entire Montana Resolution’s blueprint is staggering.
Moreover, the DOE has been explicit that “[c]onduct may constitute
unlawful sexual harassment under Title IX even if the police do not have
sufficient evidence of a criminal violation.”106  Because the standards for
criminal investigations are different, the DOE does not regard criminal stan-
dards as determinative of whether sexual harassment or violence violates
Title IX.107  The university grievance system, however, has power to impose
serious disciplinary sanctions.  Violations of university conduct carry serious
consequences.  Expulsion, suspension, or other serious actions can alter a
student’s entire life and future.108
Certainly, these consequences are deserved if the accused individual is
sexually harassing a peer within the meaning of Davis.  The idea that a stu-
dent could be accused of sexual harassment for an offense that does not
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Federal “Blueprint” for Sexual Harass-
ment Policies on Campus, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUCATION (May 28, 2013), http://
thefire.org/article/15849.html.  The website gives examples of subjectively offensive claims
that were made in universities:
• A devout Muslim student at William Paterson University was found guilty of
sexual harassment for expressing his religious objection to homosexuality in a
private email to a professor.
• A University of Denver professor was charged with sexual harassment because
of anonymous complaints over his teaching of a course segment entitled “Drugs
and Sin in American Life: From Masturbation and Prostitution to Alcohol and
Drugs,” which focuses in part on the negative effects of “purity crusades.”
• At Appalachian State University, tenured professor Jammie Price was placed on
administrative leave after students alleged that she had created a “hostile envi-
ronment.”  The allegations included making negative comments about the uni-
versity and its student athletes and showing a documentary on pornography.
Id.
105 Additional requirements include developing and carrying out a system for tracking
and reviewing claims, conducting annual surveys about the campus climate, etc.
106 See 2011 DCL, supra note 14, at 10.
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., Sander, supra note 18 (reporting on three suits—against Vassar College, St.
Joseph’s University, and Xavier University—brought by students challenging disciplinary
hearing procedures that are heavily weighted against the accused).
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meet the objective standard of Davis, and then found guilty of a university
violation under a preponderance of the evidence, however, is a troubling
result in a society that values due process, fairness, and individual rights.
Recently, a number of students have filed suits against universities, alleg-
ing that the grievance procedures were so victim-focused that due process
was lacking and administrators facilitated an environment in which a pre-
sumption of guilt prevailed.109  As universities investigate claims under the
broader standard of sexual harassment and apply the preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof, lawyers and advocates for accused students predict
an increase in these kinds of suits in years to come.110
It is vitally important that students are not discouraged from reporting
harassment.111  OCR’s goal is admirable: to provide an environment in which
victims feel comfortable reporting.  But, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, the Supreme Court offered a clear definition of sexual harassment
as a pattern of serious, persistent discriminatory behavior.  The objective
standard allowed harassers to be punished while also avoiding threats to due
process or freedom of speech.  The DOE 2003 DCL correctly utilized this
standard.  In the Montana Resolution, however, the DOE changed this stan-
dard for higher education Title IX compliance—without going through the
proper channels.  The standard set forth by the DOE has prompted a laundry
list of concerns, as both university administrators and independent groups
outside of higher education express dissatisfaction with the administrative
burdens the Montana blueprint raises and its potential chilling effect on free
speech and due process rights for the accused.
II. AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REMEDY
The April 2011 DCL and the Montana Resolution essentially forced insti-
tutions to change their policies, without any warning and without gathering
any input from the higher education community.  The bulk of the DOE’s
regulatory actions come from “Dear Colleague” letters, “significant guidance”
documents, and settlement agreements that result from OCR investiga-
tions.112  Using informal guidance to change the definition of sexual harass-
ment without any prior notice is disruptive for higher education institutions,
and the DOE’s use of informal guidance to establish a preponderance of the
evidence standard for Title IX compliance was inappropriate.113  The Mon-
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights Response to Letters of Concern Regarding
“Blueprint,” FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUCATION (May 29, 2013), http://thefire.org/
article/15854.html (explaining OCR’s goals in the Montana Resolution).
112 See Reading Room, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIVIL RTS., http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/publications.html#General-Pubs (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also
Kloster, supra note 80, at 168.
113 An Open Letter to OCR, supra note 2 (letter of a student affairs professional, writing
anonymously to OCR: “[The administrator’s] voice has been missing from this debate, just
as it seems our input was missing from your letter.  None of us want [the OCR] knocking
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tana Resolution’s blueprint defines sexual harassment so broadly that even
good faith efforts to comply could leave universities at high risk for OCR
investigation.114
When the DOE seeks to enact a change that (1) differs from the stan-
dard set forth in case law, (2) differs from previous DOE guidance, and (3)
affects every university receiving federal funding, it should enact that change
using the procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.  Simply
put, when the DOE fails to follow the procedures set forth in the APA, its
actions should be subject to judicial review.  This includes guidance that is set
forth in DCLs and Resolution Agreements.  Parts II and III of this Note
attempt to provide a brief overview of administrative law and the avenues for
challenging the change in the sexual harassment standard set forth in the
Montana Resolution’s “blueprint.”
Particularly, the APA’s notice and comment procedures would have pro-
vided university administrators with notice of a potential change and allowed
them an opportunity to voice their concerns about—or their support for—
the proposed changes.115  If this had occurred, the heated debate about free-
dom of speech would have been proactive and productive, instead of reactive
and divisive.116  Institutional concerns about due process could have been
addressed.117  University administration concerns about investigating an
increased volume of sexual harassment claims and the resulting strain on
administrative resources would have been considered before guidelines were
issued.118
The APA defines the legal authority of federal agencies, and provides a
remedy for parties adversely affected by agency action.119  Under the APA,
federal courts are authorized to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions” that violate rules codified in the APA.120  In Allen-
town Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court affirmed its view that the
APA “establishes a scheme of ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’”121  When evaluat-
ing an agency’s decisionmaking, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) provides something of
on our doors, Title IX complaint in hand, ready to put [our university] under the micro-
scope and force us to explain to you, a group of skilled attorneys, why we did what we
did.”).
114 Samantha Harris, A Massive Burden, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 13, 2013), http://www.
insidehighered.com/views/2013/06/13/essay-criticizes-education-dept-approach-sexual-
harassment.
115 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
116 See, e.g., Press Release, Senator John McCain Sends Letters, supra note 96; Lukia-
noff, supra note 79; Westerholm, supra note 95.
117 See, e.g., Bob Unruh, Illegal Flirting?  Feds Revisit ‘Sex Harassment,’ WORLDNETDAILY
(June 1, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2013/06/illegal-flirting-feds-revisit-sex-har
assment/; Lukianoff, supra note 79.
118 Harris, supra note 114.
119 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06.
120 Id. § 706(2).
121 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)).
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a catch-all provision: it prohibits agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”122  The
court must conclude that the rule promulgated by an agency is “[n]ot
only . . . within the scope of [the agency’s] lawful authority,” but also “logical
and rational.”123
The DOE has all the authority of a cabinet-level, executive branch
agency,124 which falls broadly into two categories: rulemaking125 and adjudi-
cation.126  When the OCR issues guidance documents in response to specific
investigations, as it does with Findings Letters and Resolution Agreements, it
can be difficult to determine whether it is engaging in rulemaking or adjudi-
cation.  Based on the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of similar settlement
agreements between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and pri-
vate parties in Association of Irritated Residents v. EPA,127 this Note will consider
the Montana Resolution as rulemaking.128
In the rulemaking context, the DOE regulates primarily through infor-
mal guidance.129  DOE compliance guidance comes from “significant gui-
dance documents,”130 “Dear Colleague” Letters, and Settlement Agreements.
The DOE has issued over 175 “significant guidance documents” since
1970.131  Many guidance documents and DCLs have included follow-up or
revisionary guidance documents that were released later.132  With respect to
Title IX, DOE has promulgated only one notice-and-comment rule in
response to a congressional directive since Congress enacted it in 1972.133
Section 553 of the APA notes that, except where notice or hearing is
required by statute, a notice and comment period is unnecessary when an
agency is issuing “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice,”134 or when a notice and
comment period would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.”135
122 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
123 See Allentown, 522 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added).
124 See Kloster, supra note 80, at 167.
125 5 U.S.C. § 553.
126 Id. § 554.
127 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
128 See infra Part III.
129 See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 404 (2007).
130 See generally 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 10 (showing an example of a significant
guidance document).
131 See Significant Guidance Documents, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://
www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/significant-guidance.html (listing 177 “Significant Gui-
dance Documents” by category, including some that have been withdrawn).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 7 (listing only one instance where “notice” was given: 1994-01-31—Notice of
Application of Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Fordice).
134 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
135 Id. § 553(b)(3)(B).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL411.txt unknown Seq: 19 28-APR-14 13:14
2014] challenging  title  ix’s  montana  blueprint 1831
Both informal and notice-and-comment rulemaking may be challenged
under this catch-all provision.136  Section 702 provides for judicial review of
notice-and-comment rulemaking, stating that “[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.”137
In the case of the Montana Resolution, the APA could be used to pro-
vide judicial review of the policy change regarding the sexual harassment
standard.  A university challenging the Montana Resolution could argue that
the Montana Resolution itself was a rule change that was “arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, [and] . . . not in accordance with law.”138
Given that the DOE itself acknowledged the document’s purpose as “a
blueprint for colleges and universities throughout the country,”139 a strong
argument can be made that it was engaging in legislative rulemaking.  More-
over, legal precedent gives some indication of how a court might evaluate a
university’s suit challenging the DOE’s Montana Resolution.
III. CHALLENGING THE MONTANA RESOLUTION’S “BLUEPRINT”
AS AGENCY RULEMAKING
A recent case in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Association of Irritated Residents v. EPA,140 provides some
instruction.  A comparison of the facts in Irritated Residents to the DOE’s
actions in the Montana Resolution reveals many similarities between the
cases.  Although the Irritated Residents plaintiffs ultimately did not prevail,
there is reason to think a university challenging the DOE’s Montana Settle-
ment Agreement may be more successful.  Judge Judith W. Rogers’s dissent
in Irritated Residents offers an analysis under which a court might conclude
that the DOE’s Montana Resolution was legislative rulemaking subject to
judicial review.
A. The Majority Opinion
In 2007, the D.C. Circuit, in a 2-1 decision in Association of Irritated
Residents v. EPA, considered whether consent agreements between the EPA
and animal feeding operations (AFOs) constituted EPA rulemaking.141
Although the majority ruled that the consent agreements did not constitute
rulemaking, enforcement actions within EPA’s statutory authority were, and
Judge Rogers wrote a detailed dissent outlining the flaws in the majority’s
analysis.142  Here, Irritated Residents is particularly appropriate for the pur-
136 Id.
137 Id. § 702.
138 Id. § 706(2)(A).
139 See Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 1.
140 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
141 Id. at 1028.
142 Id. at 1037–46 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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poses of this Note because it is illustrative of a situation where petitioners
challenged an agency’s use of consent agreements that are analogous, in
form, to settlement agreements.
AFOs are facilities where animals are raised for eggs, dairy, or slaugh-
ter.143  These facilities emit pollutants and are regulated by the EPA under
the Clean Air Act.  There are currently no effective methods to precisely mea-
sure AFO emissions, which hampers the EPA’s enforcement ability.144  The
EPA’s solution to this problem was to have thousands of AFOs sign a consent
agreement.  Each consent agreement was identical.145  The EPA drafted the
consent agreement with input from state government representatives, envi-
ronmental groups, local citizens’ groups, and the AFO industry.  Addition-
ally, the EPA published a draft of the agreement and sought public comment
before finalizing the draft.146  Under the agreement, each AFO assisted in
developing an emissions methodology in exchange for the EPA’s agreement
not to pursue administrative actions and lawsuits against the AFO for a
defined period of time.147  The EPA used the consent agreements as a mech-
anism to achieve compliance because it believed consent agreements were
the “quickest and most effective way” to do so.148  The EPA argued that the
agreements were a valid exercise of the agency’s enforcement discretion and,
in the alternative, if they did constitute a “rule,” that the agency complied
with the APA’s notice and comment requirements.149
Petitioners were a number of community and environmental groups
claiming that their members—who lived near AFOs—“suffer[ed] effects
ranging from reduced enjoyment of the outdoor portion of their property to
adverse health effects.”150  Petitioners brought the suit alleging that the
agreements, which were intended to bring the AFOs into eventual compli-
ance, met the definition of a “rule” under the APA.151  Petitioners argued
that the agreements were actually rules disguised as enforcement actions.  As
such, the EPA did not follow proper procedures for rulemaking and
exceeded its statutory authority by entering into the agreements.152
The majority first addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.153
This issue turned on whether the consent agreements constituted rulemak-
ing subject to APA review, or enforcement proceedings initiated at the
agency’s discretion.  If the latter, then they were not reviewable by the
143 Id. at 1028 (majority opinion).




148 Id. (quoting Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70
Fed. Reg. 4958, 4958 (Jan. 31, 2005)).
149 Id. at 1030.
150 Id. at 1028.
151 Id. at 1030.
152 Id. at 1028.
153 Id. at 1030 (“Our analysis of this case begins and ends with subject matter
jurisdiction.”).
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court.154  The court looked to Heckler v. Chaney,155 a Supreme Court case
ruling that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce . . . is a decision
generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”156
As a result, such decisions are presumptively unreviewable.157  The court
noted that the D.C. Circuit had also applied Chaney in Schering Corp. v. Heck-
ler,158 a case involving an agency’s decision to settle an enforcement agree-
ment.159  The court ruled that the EPA’s consent agreements fell squarely
within the Chaney and Schering precedents.  As such, the consent agreements
represented enforcement actions that were not subject to judicial review.160
The majority viewed the consent agreements as a “broader strategy” designed
by the EPA “to save the time and cost of litigation,” while leading “to quicker
industry-wide compliance.”161
The majority opinion also rejected the notion that the consent agree-
ments constituted a rule.162  Noting that the “APA defines a ‘rule’ as ‘an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy,’” the majority
ruled that the agreements merely conditionally deferred enforcement of stat-
utory requirements.163  The majority also rejected petitioners’ argument that
the agreements exceeded the EPA’s authority, ruling that the Acts authoriz-
ing the EPA to enforce the Clean Air Act permitted the use of consent agree-
ments.164  In short, the majority held that use of consent agreements as an
enforcement protocol did not constitute legislative rulemaking subject to
judicial review.
B. Judge Rogers’s Dissent
Judge Rogers began her analysis by framing the question before the
court as whether the scope of the EPA’s enforcement discretion is expansive
enough to cover the AFOs consent agreements.165  To Judge Rogers, it was
clear that, through its use of the consent agreements, the EPA “attempted to
secure the benefits of legislative rulemaking without the burdens of its statu-
tory duties.”166  She criticized the majority for its “boundless stretching of
Chaney to undercut the purposes of notice-and-comment rulemaking,”
154 Id.
155 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
156 See Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1031 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (alteration in
original)).
157 Id.
158 779 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
159 See Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1031.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1031–32.
162 Id. at 1033.
163 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006)).
164 Id. at 1036–37.
165 Id. at 1037 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
166 Id.
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emphasizing that even if Chaney creates a presumption of non-reviewability,
the presumption disappears when an agency “veers far afield of Congress’s
enforcement regime.”167
Judge Rogers relied on precedent that emphasized the importance of
the APA and evaluated the consequences of the EPA protocol:
[I]n enacting the APA, Congress made a judgment that notions of fairness
and informed administrative decisionmaking require that agency decisions
be made only after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity
to comment. . . . [P]ublic participation assures that the agency will have
before it the facts and information relevant to a particular administrative
problem . . . [and] increase[s] the likelihood of administrative responsive-
ness to the needs and concerns of those affected.
EPA’s new enforcement protocol will have significant and immediate
negative consequences.  As EPA acknowledges, it affects both members of
the regulated industry and those whom Congress intended to protect under
the statutes as well as the safety and health of the environment.168
Judge Rogers reasoned that the accountability and informed decision-
making that the notice and comment procedure provides was required
before the EPA could adopt an enforcement policy through consent agree-
ments that essentially eliminated enforcement for many AFOs.169
Judge Rogers also noted the factors that a court should consider when
determining if an agency promulgated a legislative rule subject to judicial
review: “Because the proposed enforcement protocol is of ‘gen-
eral . . . applicability,’ will have ‘future effect,’ and defines the rights and
obligations of members of the regulated community . . . it is a rule.”170  Rely-
ing on D.C. Circuit precedent in CropLife America v. EPA,171 Judge Rogers
determined that the EPA’s consent agreements created a new general
approach to carrying out its enforcement responsibilities.172  In doing so, the
EPA promulgated a legislative rule subject to notice and comment require-
ments under the APA.
Judge Rogers’s dissent focused on what the EPA actually did when it
used consent agreements as “the quickest and most effective way” to ensure
industry compliance.173  The dissent recognized that the EPA used its “coer-
cive power” to require compliance, without going through the APA require-
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1043 (alteration in original) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
316 (1979); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
169 Id. at 1043–44.
170 Id. at 1039 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(4)).
171 329 F.3d 876, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that an enforcement policy was a legis-
lative rule because it “create[d] a ‘binding norm’” (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1999))).
172 See Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1039.
173 Id. at 1045 (quoting Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final
Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 4958, 4958 (Jan. 31, 2005)).
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ments of notice and comment.174  In Irritated Residents, the consent decrees
were “consent decree[s] only in the sense that any regulated party has a
choice whether or not to proceed in accordance with an agency rule.”175
C. Comparing Irritated Residents to the Montana Resolution
This Note offers a comparison of the facts in Irritated Residents to the
DOE’s actions in the Montana Resolution and explains why the DOE’s
actions fit more appropriately within the framework of Judge Rogers’s dis-
sent.  If a university challenged the Montana Resolution, a court might well
reach the conclusion that Judge Rogers reached in her dissent.
Presumably, the court in Irritated Residents did not have to engage in a
full analysis of the issue of standing because it affirmed on other grounds.176
Although the idea that a university could challenge a settlement agreement
to which it was not a party raises standing issues, this Note argues that the
Montana Resolution was not merely a settlement agreement.  Rather, it was
an instance of legislative rulemaking.  When viewed in that light, any higher
education institution that has been adversely affected should be able to bring
suit, and the rule should be subject to judicial review under the APA.  Addi-
tionally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Equity in Athletics (EIA) v.
Department of Education, ruled that a non-profit organization representing
adversely affected students had standing to challenge a new DOE Title IX
rule.177  The organization had standing in that case because James Madison
University claimed that funding cuts to programs were a consequence of
bringing the institution into compliance with the new DOE rules, and the
interests EIA sought to protect were germane to its purpose.  Moreover, the
suit did “not require the participation of its individual members, as EIA
[sought] declaratory and injunctive relief against DOE’s interpretations.”178
A similar standing analysis would apply in the case of a university challenging
the Montana Resolution.
The Montana Resolution lacks even the basic notice and input that was
present in the EPA’s consent agreements in Irritated Residents.179  When the
EPA drafted the consent agreements, it consulted with government repre-
sentatives, outside groups, and the AFO industry.  The Montana Resolution
174 Id. at 1041.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1030 n.1 (majority opinion) (“Although petitioners’ standing was also chal-
lenged, this court is not bound to consider jurisdictional questions in any particular
order.” (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1999))).
177 639 F.3d 91, 95, 99 (4th Cir. 2011).
178 Id. at 99.
179 Compare RESOLUTION AGREEMENT, supra note 30, at 1 (explaining that the agree-
ment was the product of the DOJ/OCR investigation and the actions outlined within the
agreement were a result of Montana’s “willingness to further implement actions that rem-
edy the United States’ concerns identified in the attached Letter of Findings and to ensure
the University’s compliance with Title IX and Title IV”), with Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at
1029 (“[The EPA] sought public comment.”).
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was the result of an investigation conducted by OCR; only OCR and the Uni-
versity of Montana were parties to drafting the resolution.  Even the Univer-
sity of Montana did not have much say in the drafting of the Settlement
Agreement, given that its initial efforts failed to bring the university into
compliance.
The “coercive power” that Justice Rogers accused the EPA of using is
clearly present in the DOE’s guidance documents.  From DCLs to the Mon-
tana Resolution, the DOE’s use of the “coercive power”—the power to initi-
ate OCR investigations and proceedings to withdraw federal funding—
demands compliance from universities across the nation.  While the EPA in
Irritated Residents used thousands of individual consent agreements to condi-
tion compliance, the DOE used a single agreement and labeled it a
“blueprint” for other colleges and universities.  These institutions did not
even have the “choice” that was available to AFOs to sign or not sign onto the
consent decrees.  In theory, the higher education institutions could choose
not to comply but, in reality, noncompliance means inviting an OCR investi-
gation and facing a potential loss of federal funding.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstances in Irritated Residents that necessi-
tated a deferral of enforcement in exchange for help developing a methodol-
ogy are not present here.  There was a sense in the majority opinion in
Irritated Residents that the unique necessity of the AFO enforcement situation
helped sway the court’s deference to the EPA’s actions.  The consent agree-
ments were born out of the EPA’s struggle to develop a methodology for
measuring emissions, and the majority seemed sympathetic to the EPA’s
plight.  In the case of the Montana Resolution, rather, the DOE abruptly
changed its standard for defining sexual harassment, departing from prior
agency guidance and federal case law.
The EPA in Irritated Residents used the consent decrees as a mechanism
to achieve compliance because it believed consent decrees were the “quickest
and most effective way” to do so.180  In this sense, the DOE used the Montana
Resolution in the same way—as a quick and effective way to bring other uni-
versities into compliance with the desired agency standards.  Under the fac-
tors Judge Rogers cited as relevant to a court’s determination regarding
whether agency guidance constitutes a legislative rule, the Montana Resolu-
tion’s guidelines—like the EPA’s consent decrees—have “general applicabil-
ity” and “future effect,” and they “define[ ] the rights and obligations of
members of the regulated community.”181  The Montana Resolution should
be considered a legislative rule.
Judge Rogers’s reference to CropLife America v. EPA in her dissent is also
on point.182  The analysis in CropLife frames the relevant judicial inquiry in a
Montana Resolution suit.  Although CropLife did not involve the use of con-
sent agreements, it outlined the factors that a court considers when deter-
mining if agency guidance is binding. 
180 See Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1029.
181 Id. at 1039 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
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In CropLife, the EPA issued a directive in a press release,183 announcing
that it would no longer consider certain studies in its regulatory decision
making.184  Petitioners were pesticide manufacturers and a trade association
claiming that their members would be adversely affected by the moratorium;
they sought review of the directive announced in the press release.185  The
court evaluated the agency’s action to determine “whether the agency action
binds private parties or the agency itself with the ‘force of law.’”186  In
CropLife, there was “little doubt” that the directive bound the private parties
(and the agency itself) with the “force of law.”187  The court held that the
EPA was required to follow notice and comment procedures because the rule
“effect[ed] a dramatic change in the agency’s established regulatory regime.”188  Simi-
larly, the DOE’s Montana Resolution made a dramatic change to the stan-
dard for determining sexual harassment for Title IX compliance and, like the
EPA in CropLife, the DOE should be required to follow notice and comment
procedures.
Furthermore, the court in CropLife emphasized that an agency’s “charac-
terization of its own action is not controlling if it self-servingly disclaims any
intention to create a rule with the ‘force of law,’ but the record indicates
otherwise.”189  This is particularly important for Montana Resolution litiga-
tion because the DOE has already begun to back away from the subjective
standard.  In a November 2013 letter to the Foundation for Individual Rights
in Education, OCR’s Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Catherine Lhamon
responded to FIRE’s letters of concern regarding the Montana Resolution,
stating that “the Agreement in the Montana case represents the resolution of
that particular case and not OCR or DOJ policy.”190  Yet, this letter to FIRE
does not constitute new Title IX guidance, nor does it undo the Montana
Resolution’s “blueprint” statement.  Although the DOE may use it as evi-
dence that the Montana Resolution is not binding on other universities, it is
simply another factor for the court to consider in evaluating whether or not
the DOE engaged in legislative rulemaking.191  The court will not find the
letter controlling if the court determines that the letter is merely a “self-serv-
183 It is worth noting that the press release in CropLife is certainly similar to the DOE’s
Dear Colleague Letters.
184 CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
185 Id. at 878.
186 Id. at 883 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
189 Id. at 883; see also Gen. Elec. Co., 290 F.3d at 382 (showing the EPA urged the court to
consider the agency’s own characterization of its actions); Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of
Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining the steps an agency must
take up when engaging in rulemaking).
190 Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Dep’t of Educ., Off. for Civ. Rts. Ass’t Sec’y, to
FIRE, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUCATION 2 (Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://thefire
.org/article/16506.html.
191 Indeed, it would be foolish for the DOE to say anything other than what it says in
the letter because admitting that the Montana Resolution is binding on all universities
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ing” disclaimer.  The true inquiry is whether the DOE, through the Montana
Resolution “blueprint,” intended to create a rule that operates with the force
of law.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the traditional wisdom dictates that universities defer to the
DOE, successful legal pushback by colleges against excessive informal regula-
tion could force the DOE to comply with the APA when it promulgates rules
for higher education.  The difficult part of bringing suit against the DOE for
the Montana Resolution is getting past the hurdle of Chaney.  Once a court
accepts that the Montana Resolution was rulemaking, then the rules promul-
gated in the Montana Resolution are subject to judicial review.  The DOE’s
actions can be challenged on two grounds: (1) a procedural challenge, argu-
ing that it violated the notice and comment procedures required for infor-
mal rulemaking, and (2) a substantive challenge on the merit of the rule,
arguing that the use of the subjective standard is “arbitrary and capricious”
because it deviates from the Supreme Court’s test in Davis.
A successful procedural challenge would lead to a court’s ruling to
vacate the DOE’s rule, forcing the DOE to go through notice and comment
in order to promulgate a rule if OCR still wanted to change the sexual harass-
ment standard.  If a case against the DOE is successful, it would serve to rein-
force the notion that “agency should not be able to impede judicial
review,”192 and future rules would be promulgated with institutional input.
Concerns about due process, fairness in the grievance process, administrative
burdens, and freedom of speech can be addressed prior to instituting a legis-
lative rule.
Additionally, shifting litigation risk to the DOE is advantageous to uni-
versities.193  The DOE should recognize that although it has been given
power to enforce Title IX, the rights of university students, faculty, and
administrators must be respected.194  The procedural argument is not that
the DOE cannot promulgate a rule requiring the use of the subjective sexual
harassment standard in Title IX compliance, but rather that it must go
through the requisite APA notice and comment procedures before promulgat-
ing this legislative rule.
Once an agency’s action is deemed to be rulemaking and is subject to
judicial review, the court evaluates an agency’s decisionmaking under the
APA.  Substantive review of an agency’s interpretation of its regulations is
governed by section 706(2)(A), which prohibits agency action that is “arbi-
would be an admission that the DOE engaged in legislative rulemaking with the force of
law to bind all higher education institutions.
192 Allentown Mack Sales & Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998).
193 See Kloster, supra note 80, at 175.
194 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL411.txt unknown Seq: 27 28-APR-14 13:14
2014] challenging  title  ix’s  montana  blueprint 1839
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”195
In Allentown Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court analyzed
agency action under this “catch-all” provision, noting: “It is hard to imagine a
more violent breach of [the arbitrary and capricious] requirement than
applying a rule of primary conduct or a standard of proof which is in fact
different from the rule or standard formally announced.”196  Given the fact
that the change in sexual harassment standards deviates from prior agency
guidance and, more importantly, from relevant Supreme Court case law, a
university could argue that the DOE’s shift in definitions was arbitrary and
capricious.  Unlike the April 2011 DCL, which stated that the “preponder-
ance of the evidence standard” is derived from the burden of proof used in
civil litigation, the DOE gives no reasoned or logical explanation for chang-
ing the sexual harassment standard in the Montana Resolution.  Under Allen-
town, an attack on the Montana Resolution under the APA’s “arbitrary and
capricious” requirements might well be successful, and the court would be
required to set aside the agency’s action.197
This is not to diminish the risks involved with bringing suit: fighting back
could risk an OCR investigation or proceedings to withdraw federal funding,
not to mention the bad press that could surround litigation regarding sexual
harassment standards.  These concerns may be overstated, however, espe-
cially if a large university—one that receives millions of dollars of federal
funding—leads the challenge.  As Part III has argued, there are strong argu-
ments in favor of viewing the Montana Resolution as agency rulemaking.
This argument is bolstered by the DOE’s blunt declarations that the Montana
Agreement is meant to be a compliance standard for the rest of the higher
education institutions.  Under the APA, a document that the DOE itself labels
as a “blueprint for colleges and universities throughout the country”198
should certainly be subject to judicial review.
The DOE has never pulled federal funding from a university.199  In the
event that DOE did initiate an OCR investigation to determine the eligibility
of a university to receive federal funding, the university would have ample
opportunity to change its mind, come into compliance, and enter into a set-
tlement agreement with the DOE to avoid losing funding.
It is highly unlikely that the DOE would ever pull federal funding from
major research universities that receive hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal funding each year.  Moreover, a university challenging DOE rulemak-
195 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
196 522 U.S. at 374.
197 Id. at 377 (“Substantive review of an agency’s interpretation of its regulations is
governed only by that general provision of the Administrative Procedure Act which
requires courts to set aside agency action that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A))).
198 See Findings Letter, supra note 22, at 1.
199 The DOE has always utilized settlement agreements when dealing with Title IX
investigations.
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ing might well receive the support of outside groups (e.g., Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education, American Association of University Profes-
sors, Senator McCain) that have already expressed their displeasure at the
DOE’s regulatory actions.
CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment remains an issue on college campuses across the
nation.  As the chief enforcer of Title IX in higher education, the Depart-
ment of Education aims to work cooperatively with universities to ensure that
all students feel safe in their communities.  Unfortunately, the Department of
Education has used its immense power to coerce universities into complying
with its rules.  These rules have been implemented without following the
requirements set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.  Given the issues
raised by the Montana Resolution, a legal challenge to the Department of
Education’s standards could succeed.  Simply put, when the Department of
Education needlessly—and without going through the proper channels—
changes its standards for universities, those rules should be subject to judicial
review.
